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III

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This case concerns an appeal of an administrative citation issued by the Kootenai County

Building and Planning Department (hereinafter referred to as "the Department") for a violation
of the Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance on real property owned by Dr. Douglas
Stafford and Michelle Stafford (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Stafford" or individually
as "Dr. Stafford" and "Ms. Stafford," respectively), the Appellants in this appeal. The issuance
of this citation was upheld in an administrative appeal to the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners, the Respondents in this appeal (hereinafter referred to as "the Board").

B.

Concise Statement of Facts
Stafford owns the property which is the subject of this appeal and of the underlying code

violation, Code Violation No. CV07-0092 (hereinafter referred to as "the subject property").
The subject property is located at 2707 E. Mockingbird Loop, Harrison, Idaho 83833, and is
legally described as Lots 15 and 16, Block 1, Amended Plat of Coeur d'Alene Lake Estates,
according to the plat recorded at Book "G" of Plats, Page 479A, Records of Kootenai County,
Idaho. This property has been assigned Parcel Number 01450001015A by the Kootenai County
Assessor. A.R. p. 5-8,629.
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I References to the agency record prepared by the County in this matter (Case Nos. APP08-0002 and CV07-0092)
for the Petition for Judicial Review in the District Court will use the abbreviation "A.R." (See R. p. 154.)
References to the clerk's record prepared for this appeal will use the standard abbreviation "R." References to the
transcript of the hearings held before the Kootenai County Hearing Examiner and the Board of Commissioners will
use the abbreviation "Tr." (See id.)

A building permit was issued to the subject property on July 27, 1999 (Permit No.
30796). The site plan submitted with the Application for Permit No. 30796 showed that there
was fifty feet (50') from the deck on the house to the ordinary high water mark of Lake Coeur
d'Alene. A condition of that permit specifically addressed the placement ofa Orassy Infiltration
Area (OIA) on the property by stating that "Lake City Engineering need[s] to move [the] OIA
out of [the] 25 foot buffer zone." The single family residence for Permit No. 30796 was issued a
Certificate of Occupancy on March 23, 2000, and the financial guarantee posted by the property
owner was refunded on June 7,2000. A.R. p. 28-45.
The reference to the "25 foot buffer zone" referred to the requirement of Section 8(B) of
the Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance that all owners of property along the shorelines
of certain lakes and rivers in Kootenai County, including Coeur d'Alene Lake, retain an
undisturbed natural vegetation buffer (also hereinafter referred to as the "no-disturbance zone")
of at least twenty-five feet (25') in slope distance from that lake or river's ordinary high water
mark (OHWM).

A.R. p. 920, 928, 940, 949, 961, 969-70.

This requirement has been

continuously in effect since the first Site Disturbance Ordinance, Ordinance No. 251, was
adopted on October 15, 1996. Jd.
A building permit for an addition and/or alteration to the previously approved single
family residence was issued on July 25, 2006 (Permit No. 40613). The site plan and the Site
Disturbance Plan submitted with that application both show a fifty foot (50') setback from the
OHWM of Lake Coeur d'Alene.

These plans did not depict any development or activity

completely within twenty-five feet (25') of the OHWM. A.R. p. 67-77.
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A photograph taken by Kootenai County Assessor's Office staff in 2000, approximately
four months after the Certificate of Occupancy was issued in conjunction with Permit No. 30796,
showed that there was still natural vegetation existing within the no-disturbance zone, consistent
with County approvals and the application materials provided by the owner at that time. A.R. p.
9- 10. A photograph taken by Assessor's Office staff on July I 1,200 I, however, showed that site
disturbance work was ongoing within the no-disturbance zone even though no application for a
site disturbance permit for such activities had been submitted. A.R. p. 11-12. Photographs taken
by Assessor's Office staff on July 17, 2002 show that both a manicured lawn and a rock
bulkhead had been placed within the no-disturbance zone in a manner inconsistent with the site
plans submitted and approved for Permit Nos. 30796 and 406 13, and in violation of Section 8(B)
of the Site Disturbance Ordinance. A.R. p. I 2A -20. Photographs of the subject property taken
by Department staff on August 28, 2007 and August 29, 2007 show that an unpermitted
waterfall, manicured lawn, bulkhead, swales, sand and boulders had all been placed within the
no-disturbance zone. A.R. p. 20-27. The condition of the subject property has not materially
changed since that time. Tr. p. 25-35, 57-70, 80-86.
C.

Course of Proceedings
On August 29, 2007, the Department issued a Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance

Violation for a violation of the no-disturbance zone. A.R. p. 5-6. After this Notice of Violation
was issued, there were discussion and correspondence between Stafford's representatives and the
Department concerning whether a remediation plan to return the no-disturbance zone to a natural
state was necessary, and concerning what such a plan would require. A.R. p. 100-26. Because
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there was an active code violation on the property, the Department would not issue Stafford a
Certificate of Occupancy for the addition constructed pursuant to Permit No. 40613 until a
remediation plan for the no-disturbance zone was approved. See A.R. p. 113-41.
The Department mailed a second Notice of Site Disturbance Ordinance Violation letter to
Stafford on March 19, 2008. This notice stated that Stafford had thirty (30) days to appeal the
violation, and absent an appeal, had forty-five (45) days to resolve the violation. A.R. p. 127-32.
On March 21, 2008, John Magnuson, legal counsel for Stafford, submitted an appeal of the
March 19,2008 Notice of Violation. A.R. p. 138.
An appeal hearing was held before Kootenai County Hearing Examiner Lisa Key on
October 2, 2008.

A.R. p. 317-22; Tr. p. 1-36.

At that appeal hearing, Ms. Key received

testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr. Stafford, and from Building and Planning
Department staff. A.R. p. 200-316, 328-92, 394-467; Tr. p. 3-35. Ms. Key issued a decision
affirming the Department's issuance of the Notice of Violation on October 15, 2008, though she
did recommend that a rescheduling fee in the amount of $240 be refunded. A.R. p. 468-83.
The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the "Board")
held an appeal hearing on this matter on February 12, 2009. A.R. p. 586-91; Tr. p. 37-99. At
that appeal hearing, the Board received testimony and evidence from Mr. Magnuson, Dr.
Stafford, Ms. Stafford, and from Building and Planning Department staff. A.R. p. 596-610; Tr.
p. 38-70, 75-89. Bret Bowers and Greg Delevan were given the opportunity to explain why they
were "affected persons," but were not allowed to testify to the merits of the appeal. Tr. p. 70-74.
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After hearing testimony and receiving evidence, the Board conducted deliberations on the
appeal. Tr. p. 90-98. The Board found that the testimony and evidence showed that there had
been disturbances dating back to 2001 within the no-disturbance zone required under Section
8(B) of Ordinance No. 283, the Site Disturbance Ordinance in effect at that time. The Board
further found that the state of this buffer was an ongoing violation of the provisions of the Site
Disturbance Ordinance as set forth in both Ordinance No. 283 and Ordinance No. 374 (and
which was originally set forth in Ordinance No. 25 I). The Board also found that the work
performed within the no-disturbance zone did not predate the enactment of Ordinance No. 251,
which was when the no-disturbance zone was first established. The Board concurred with the
Hearing Examiner's analysis of the meaning of the term "supersede," which concluded that it
was intended to be synonymous with the term "replace," but was not intended to be interpreted
to mean "render null and void." A.R. p. 622-23; Tr. p. 90-96.
The Board required Stafford to have a design professional prepare a plan for the
remediation of the no-disturbance zone, which would be subject to approval by the Department.
The work set forth in the plan was then to be completed as weather and lake level conditions
permitted. A.R. p. 623; Tr. p. 97. The Board did specifically allow the barbeque pit straddling
the boundary of the no-disturbance zone to remain, since it had been depicted on plans
previously approved by the Department.

A.R. p. 623; Tr. p. 92-93, 97.

The Board also

concurred with the Hearing Examiner's recommendation that the $240.00 rescheduling fee be
refunded to Stafford. A.R. p. 623-24; Tr. p. 90-91, 97.
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The Board issued a written Order of Decision affirming the Department's issuance of the
Notice of Violation on March 19,2009. A.R. p. 616-24; Tr. p. 100-03. The Board issued an
Amended Order of Decision changing the timeline for compliance on April 16, 2009. A.R. p.
742-50; Tr. p. 104-08.

Stafford timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Board's

decision on March 27, 2009, and filed a First Amended Petition for Judicial Review on April 24,
2009. A.R. p. 722-32, 751-6l. On December 2,2009, the District Court entered a Memorandum
Decision and Order on Appeal which affirmed the Board's Amended Order of Decision. R. p.
130-47. Stafford then timely filed this appeal on January 13,2010. R. p. 148-5l.

II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL
A.

Whether any substantial rights were prejudiced by the Board's decision in Case

No. APP08-0002.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a decision of a local governing board pursuant to the Local
Land Use Planning Act, Title 67, Chapter 65, Idaho Code (LLUPA), on appeal from a decision
of the District Court on a petition for judicial review of the local governing board's decision, has
been recently set forth by this Court as follows:
In an appeal from district court, where the court was acting in its appellate
capacity ... , the Supreme Court reviews the agency record independently of the
district court's decision. As to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, this
Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning agency. The Court
defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and the
agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even when
there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are
supported by evidence in the record. Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to
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a strong presumption of validity, including the agency's application and
interpretation of its own zoning ordinances.
The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that the
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in excess of
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. The party attacking the agency's action must first illustrate that it erred
in the manner specified therein and must then show that a substantial right of the
party has been prejudiced.

Neighbors/or a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 126, 176 P.3d 126, 131
(2007) (citations omitted).

On the other hand, this Court exercises free review of decisions

regarding the application of estoppel because such decisions generally involve mixed questions
of law and fact which primarily present questions of law. Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812,
186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008).

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court correctly held that the decision of the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners in Case No. APP08-0002 was not in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions, or provisions of county ordinance.
I.

The conduct at issue constitutes an ongoing violation of Section 8(B) of the Site
Disturbance Ordinance then in effect from the summer of2001 to date.

Article XII, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code § 67-6518 authorize the
enactment of ordinances setting development standards in a variety of areas, including standards
for site disturbances and storm water control.

The first Kootenai County Site Disturbance

Ordinance, Ordinance No. 251, was adopted on October 15, 1996. A.R. p. 958-78. Ordinance
No. 283, which replaced Ordinance No. 251, was adopted on July 21, 1999. A.R. p. 937-57.
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Ordinance No. 374, which replaced Ordinance No. 283, was adopted on December 8, 2005.
A.R. p. 917-36. Section 8(B) of Ordinance No. 251 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Waterfront Lots For lots with frontage on a recognized lake or the Coeur d'Alene
or Spokane Rivers, an undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at
the waterfront. A stairway or walkway (which does not exceed 4 feet in width),
stairway landings (which do not exceed 6 feet in width or length), or a tram shall
be allowed to encroach within the buffer. The buffer shall be a minimum of 25
feet in slope distance from the high water mark of the water body. For purposes
of this Ordinance, high water marks shall be considered to be the following
elevations:
Coeur d'Alene Lake

2125.0 (N.G.Y.D. 1929 datum) .... 2

A.R. p. 969-70. In Section 4 of that ordinance, "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" is defined
as "[a]n area where no development activity has occurred or will occur, including, but not
limited to, logging, construction of utility trenches, roads, structures, or surface and storm water
facilities. Buffer areas shall be left in their natural state." A.R. p. 961. The definition of the
term "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer" and the regulations pertaining to undisturbed
natural vegetation buffers did not change upon enactment of either Ordinance No. 283 or
Ordinance No. 374. See A.R. p. 920, 928, 940,949.
Department staff documented, through testimony and photographs obtained from the
County Assessor in 200 I and photographs taken by Department staff in 2008, that Stafford
caused site disturbances to occur, and work to be performed, within the no-disturbance zone
during the summer of 2001. See A.R. p. 9-27. Stafford admitted as much at the hearings on this

2 As stated in Appellants' Opening Brief, the ordinary high water mark of Lake Coeur d'Alene of2,125.0'
(N.G.V.O. 1929 datum) equates to elevation 2,128.0' (WWP/A vista datum). See Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 3 n.
3; In re Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 147 P.3d 75 (2006).
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appeal. See Tr. p. 25-31, 57-70, 75-77; see also Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 5-7,17-18. This
led to the withholding of a Certificate of Occupancy for an addition as authorized under Section
13 of the Site Disturbance Ordinance, which states that "[tJhe Administrator may ... withhold
further issuance of permits" upon citation for a violation of the ordinance. See A.R. p. 113-41.
Stafford has attempted to argue, however, that because the work occurred in 2001, while
Ordinance No. 283 was in effect, it should not be enforced as a violation of Ordinance No. 374
(notwithstanding the identical relevant language).
What this argument ignores is the fact that the landscaping within the no-disturbance
zone is an ongoing violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance in effect at any given time. Each
ordinance has mandated that a 25-foot "undisturbed natural vegetation buffer shall be retained at
the waterfront" on all property fronting Lake Coeur d' Alene. A.R. p. 928, 949, 969 (emphasis
added). The presence of rock bulkheads, waterfalls, manicured lawns, swales, sand and boulders
all violate this clear mandate, and do so every day they continue to be present within this nodisturbance zone, regardless of however aesthetically pleasing these features may be. Therefore,
it was perfectly lawful and appropriate to cite Stafford for an ongoing violation of this provision
of the Site Disturbance Ordinance currently in effect, Ordinance No. 374.
2.

The ongoing nature of this violation renders the argument over the meaning of the
term "supersede" moot. Alternatively, this term should be construed to mean
"replace" rather than "render null and void."

Stafford also argues that the Board's determination that the Stafford property was in
violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance was
improper because the enactment of Ordinance No. 374 "superseded" Ordinance No. 283. As
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discussed above, however, this ignores the fact that the violation at issue is ongoing in nature. A
violation of Ordinance No. 283 occurred every day from the time the first disturbance occurred
in the summer of 2001 until Ordinance No. 374 took effect on December 12, 2005, and a
violation of Ordinance No. 374 has occurred every day from that date forward. Therefore, this
issue of the meaning of "supersede" as used in Ordinance No. 374 is moot.
Even if the Court were to consider the fact that Ordinance No. 374 superseded Ordinance
No. 283 to be relevant to its decision, the citation for violating the no-disturbance zone
requirement was proper nevertheless.

No Idaho appellate opinion has provided a definitive

definition for the word "supersede." However, a recent decision of the Montana Supreme Court
employed the following definition: "Supersede is defined in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary as '2: to take the place, room, or position of; 3: to displace in favor ofanother.'" Pula
v. State, 40 P.3d 364, 374 (Mont. 2002).3 This definition more accurately describes the effect of
the adoption of Ordinance No. 374, as it pertained to the same subject matter and replaced
Ordinance No. 283 as of its effective date of December 12,2005.
It is true that from that date forward, Ordinance No. 283 had no further force or effect.

This does not change the fact that Ordinance No. 283 was in full force and effect until December
12, 2005, however. Any other interpretation would lead to the absurd result of making conduct
which was unlawful at the time it occurred suddenly lawful as a nonconforming use.

A

nonconforming use is in fact a use of property which was lawful at the time it was established

3

See R. p. 108-19.
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but is not in compliance with ordinance provisions currently in effect. Baxter v. City of Preston,
115 Idaho 607, 608-09, 768 P.2d 1340, 1341-42 (1989).

This "grandfather right" simply

"protects the owner from abrupt termination of what had been a lawful condition or activity on
the property" but "does not extend beyond this purpose." Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104
Idaho 307, 309, 658 P.2d 978, 980 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added). Thus, the interpretation of
the effect of the word "supersede" advanced by Stafford would turn the longstanding legal
principle of nonconforming uses on its head. It would also contravene this Court's previous
holding that a city or county cannot permit activities which are prohibited under its land use
ordinances. City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 845-46,136 P.3d 310, 316-17
(2006).
Stafford also emphasizes the fact that each Site Disturbance Ordinance provides that
violations thereof are misdemeanors punishable upon conviction via fine and/or incarceration.

See A.R. p. 932, 952, 973. While this is true, the emphasis on these potential criminal penalties
is misplaced. First of all, each of these ordinances is primarily regulatory in nature, in that they
generally permit conduct subject to the regulations contained therein, as opposed to statutes that
are primarily penal in nature, which are intended to prohibit conduct. See California v. Cabazon

Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207-12, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1087-89 (1987) (finding
California statute was "civil/regulatory" in nature, and therefore not enforceable by the State of
California or a political subdivision thereof within an Indian reservation under Public Law 280,
even though it prescribed criminal penalties for violations).

Secondly, this argument again

ignores the plain language of these provisions which states that each day on which a violation

II

occurs constitutes a separate offense. See A.R. p. 932, 952, 973. The violation at issue is an
ongoing violation, not a one-time violation. Finally, these arguments are inapplicable because
this is not an appeal of a criminal conviction for a violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance. It
is instead an appeal of a decision to issue an administrative citation, civil in nature, for that
violation. Therefore, Stafford's arguments regarding concepts of criminal law such as double
jeopardy or the ex post/acto application of a law simply do not apply.
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In addition, this language must be read in conjunction with Section 1-2-3 of the Kootenai
County Code, which was adopted via the enactment of Ordinance No. 337, effective as of
August 30, 2004. This section reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
No new ordinance shall be construed or held to repeal a former ordinance
whether such former ordinance is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense
committed against such former ordinance or as to any act done, any penalty,
forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued or claim arising under
the former ordinance, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense or act so
committed or so done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred or
any right accrued or claim arising before the new ordinance takes effect.. ..
K.C.C. § 1-2-3. 5 This language specifically provides that an ordinance violation may continue to
be prosecuted even after a new ordinance is enacted which has the effect of replacing or
superseding the ordinance in effect at the time of the violation, or even if the new ordinance
expressly repeals the ordinance previously in effect. Therefore, the discussion of the effect of
the enactment of Ordinance No. 374 as "superseding" Ordinance No. 283 is of no import.

4 As the District Court pointed out, the ex post facto argument also fails because the activities in question were not
"innocent when done," as they were always prohibited under the Site Disturbance Ordinance during the relevant
time period. R. p. 137-38; see also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,41-42,110 S.Ct. 2715, 2718-19 (1990).
5

See R. p. 100-06.
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Stafford, however, has attempted to argue that the language of Section 1-2-3 of the
Kootenai County Code actually supports the argument that the County should have indicated that
the violation was of Ordinance No. 283, as opposed to Ordinance No. 374. This argument fails
for two reasons. First, it ignores the plain language of this section, which merely states that an
action regarding a violation of an ordinance is not extinguished merely by virtue of the
enactment of a new ordinance, even if the new ordinance repealed the ordinance in effect at the
time of the violation. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it ignores the fact that the violation
is ongoing in nature, as opposed to the one-time violation theory advanced by Stafford.
In summary, the fact that Ordinance No. 374 "superseded" Ordinance No. 283 does not
excuse Stafford's violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance because the violation is ongoing in
nature, because the word "supersede" should be read so as to avoid absurd results, and because
actions for violation of an ordinance expressly survive the enactment of a new ordinance
pertaining to the same subject matter, even if the new ordinance repeals (or supersedes) the
ordinance in effect at the time of the violation. Therefore, this Court should affirm the decision
of the District Court, which affirmed the decision of the Board in this matter.
3.

The decision of the Board properly applied the language of Section 8(B) of the
Site Disturbance Ordinance to the facts of this case.

Stafford also argues that the Board's determination that the Stafford property was in
violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance was
improper because the Department failed to show that the work performed within the nodisturbance zone had any significant adverse effects.
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Stafford also contends that the work

actually had a beneficial effect, as it cleaned up the pre-existing slash pile and noxious weeds
which were present in that area.
These arguments miss the point, which is that this property is required, and at all relevant
times has been required, to maintain a 25-foot undisturbed natural vegetation buffer from the
ordinary high water mark of Lake Coeur d'Alene.

This "no-disturbance zone" serves the

purpose of the Site Disturbance Ordinance by minimizing the risk of erosion, sedimentation and
runoff (whether from stormwater or human activity) into Kootenai County's lakes, and
particularly Lake Coeur d' Alene, from whatever source. See A.R. p. 78.
The facts supporting the finding that Stafford is in violation of this requirement are
undisputed. It is not necessary to also prove the existence of actual "significant adverse effects"
in order to cite a property owner for such a violation of any provision of this ordinance, including
the no-disturbance zone mandate; rather, it is sufficient simply to prove that a violation did in
fact occur. In illustrating this concept, the District Court made an analogy to a person charged
with driving under the influence. See R. p. 140-41. In that case, the prosecutor need not prove
that the defendant "would have caused death or injury on the highway," but instead only needs to
prove that the defendant "was driving or in control of a vehicle on a highway while impaired."

See id.
It may well be that the features placed within the no-disturbance zone make the shoreline
more aesthetically pleasing than was the case prior to their placement within the no-disturbance
zone. However, when one looks below the surface, such features in such close proximity to the
lake are not necessarily beneficial. Added sand quickly washes into the lake, particularly during
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periods of high water. Lawns typically are watered, and are often fertilized.

Thus, the Site

Disturbance Ordinance requires that storm water treatment occur landward of the no-disturbance
zone. See A.R. p. 87, 89. Otherwise, nutrients would flow unchecked into the lake. Water
features such as the one on the Stafford property are not allowed in the no-disturbance zone for
the same reasons. See A.R. p. 27. Rock walls and boulders also slowly erode over time. The
Board recognized that what may be aesthetically pleasing is not necessarily beneficial to the
environment, and thus ordered that the no-disturbance zone be remediated to a more natural state
as determined by a design professional, as defined in the Site Disturbance Ordinance, in a
remediation plan approved by the Department. See A.R. p. 79, 623, 626.
The undisputed evidence shows that there is an ongoing violation of the no-disturbance
zone mandate of the Site Disturbance Ordinance on the Stafford property, regardless of whether
this violation has itself caused any "significant adverse effects" on Lake Coeur d'Alene.
Therefore, the District Court correctly found that the Board had properly applied the language of
the Site Disturbance Ordinance, which has remained unchanged since the activities at issue
began, to the facts of this case.

Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's

decision that the Board correctly found that Stafford was properly cited for a violation of the Site
Disturbance Ordinance.

II
II
II
II
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B.

The District Court correctly held that the decision of the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners in Case No. APP08-0002 was supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the Board's
discretion.
1.

The decision of the Board was supported by substantial, undisputed evidence in
the record.

This Court has defined "substantial evidence" as "relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept to support a conclusion." Lamar Corp v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36,
42-43, 981 P .2d 1146, 1152-53 (1999). It is "less than a preponderance of evidence, but more
than a mere scintilla." Cowan v. Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 517, 148 P.3d 1247, 1263
(2006). Substantial evidence "need not be uncontradicted, nor does it need to necessarily lead to
a certain conclusion; it need only be of such sufficient quantity and probative value that
reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder." Id.
As discussed above, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that a violation of the
no-disturbance zone mandate of the Site Disturbance Ordinance currently exists on the Stafford
property.

Therefore, the District Court correctly found that the Board's decision that the

Department had properly issued a citation to Stafford for violating the Site Disturbance
Ordinance was based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
2.

The decision of the Board was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

A decision of a governing board will be considered "arbitrary and capricious," and an
abuse of the governing board's discretion, only if it was made "without a rational basis, or in
disregard of the facts and circumstances, or without adequate determining principles." Lane
Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91,175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007). As long as
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the governing board has been found to have acted within the bounds of its discretion, however, a
reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the governing board.

ld.

Where

reasonable minds may differ, "an action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly
and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has
been reached." Enterprise, Inc. v. City a/Nampa, 96 Idaho 734, 739, 536 P.2d 729, 734 (1975).
As discussed above, the Board took the facts and circumstances set forth in the
undisputed evidence into account in making the decision that a violation of the no-disturbance
zone requirement of the Site Disturbance Ordinance did occur and does currently exist on the
Stafford property, and that the Department properly cited Stafford for that violation.

This

decision thus had a rational basis and was based on adequate determining principles. Therefore,
the District Court correctly found that the Board's decision that the Department had properly
issued a citation to Stafford for violating the Site Disturbance Ordinance was not arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of the Board's discretion.
C.

The District Court correctly held that the County was not estopped from citing
Stafford for a violation of the Site Disturbance Ordinance.
Stafford correctly notes that the doctrine of estoppel is generally not applied against

governmental entities, and also correctly states that this Court has refused to impose an absolute
bar on the application of estoppel against governmental entities, particularly if the entity is acting
in a proprietary or business capacity. See Murtaugh Hwy. Dist. v. Twin Falls Hwy. Dist., 65
Idaho 260, 142 P.2d 579, 582 (1943). The doctrine of estoppel, however, is strongly disfavored
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in cases involving a governmental entity acting in a governmental or discretionary capacity, as is
the case when it is acting to enforce duly enacted land use ordinances.
In Harrell v. City o.lLewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.2d 470 (1973), this Court discussed
the history of its prior decisions regarding the application of estoppel against governmental
entities, and also discussed the fact that some jurisdictions had refused to do so in any
circumstance concerning the enactment or enforcement of zoning regulations, while other
jurisdictions would do so only under "extraordinary circumstances." Harrell, 95 Idaho at 24748,506 P.2d at 474-75. The Harrell Court then adopted the "extraordinary circumstances" rule,
and found that no exigency existed such as would estop the City of Lewiston from refusing to
issue a building permit on the basis that the property at issue was zoned F (Farm) rather than C-3
(Commercial).
A later decision of this Court concerned whether a rezoning of property in 1993 which
was the subject of a development agreement originally entered into in 1973 constituted a
violation of that agreement. Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 127 Idaho
576, 578-80, 903 P.2d 741, 743-45 (1995). In that case, the City of Hailey conceded that the
property owner's predecessor in interest had fulfilled the terms and conditions of the agreement.

ld. at 579, 903 P.2d at 744. The then-current property owner had contended that the City of
Hailey should have been estopped from changing its position as to its obligations under the
development agreement, since the City had "received the benefit of its bargain." ld. at 582-83,
903 P.2d at 747-48. The Sprenger Court, however, found that the application of estoppel was
not appropriate because the City did not breach the agreement, the agreement did not impose a
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"regulatory freeze" on the property in question, and the property owner did not rely to its
detriment on the prior zoning as opposed to the new zoning. Id. at 582-83, 903 P.2d at 747-48.
Most recently, this Court has had occasion to extend the rule from Harrell and Sprenger
to a case involving a subdivision application. Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193, 198201, 207 P.3d 169, 174-77 (2009). In that case, the property owners had applied for preliminary
subdivision approval based on planning staff's interpretation that the property in question did not
lie within Blaine County's "Mountain Overlay District" (MOD). Id. at 196-97, 207 P .3d at 17273. They had contended that because they had relied on this interpretation to their detriment in
the form of expenditures of large sums of money in preparing the subdivision application, the
county should be estopped from denying the application on the basis that the property was within
the MOD. !d. at 200, 207 P.3d at 176. This Court, however, once again declined to apply the
doctrine of estoppel in this matter, expressly finding that to do so would "strip the [governing]
boards of their sole statutory authority to approve or deny subdivision applications." Jd. at 20001,207 P.3d at 176-77.
In this case, the police power being exercised by the County is the power to enforce its
duly enacted ordinances - in particular, the Site Disturbance Ordinance. Therefore, this Court
should find that the cases which strongly disfavor the application of estoppel against a
governmental entity acting in a governmental capacity are on point in deciding this case.
Here, Stafford places much emphasis on the fact that an unnamed Department employee
told Dr. Stafford that "re-greening is not a problem." See Tr. p. 66. Although "re-greening"
could be (and is properly) construed to mean planting native vegetation, Dr. Stafford apparently
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took this to mean he could plant what eventually became a manicured lawn within the nodisturbance

zone.

This

could

perhaps

be. chalked

up

as

a

misunderstanding,

a

miscommunication, or perhaps even an honest error in stating what would be an acceptable
remediation of a no-disturbance zone. Stafford, however, went far beyond this, committing an
even more egregious violation of the no-disturbance zone requirement by placing such features
as a rock bulkhead, a water feature flowing directly into the lake, additional sand, and basalt
boulders within this area. While the County did issue a site disturbance permit in conjunction
with the building permit for the addition, this permit did not authorize either then-existing or
future disturbances in the no-disturbance zone.

Terrazas confirmed once and for all that the Board is the final arbiter of how its land use
ordinances should be interpreted, and that such pronouncements govern over contrary
interpretations made by Department staff. See Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 198-201,207 P.3d at 17477. Thus, misunderstood or erroneous advice given by a Department staff member or a site
inspection which does not immediately lead to a citation for an ordinance violation cannot be
used as a basis to estop the County from taking action to enforce its land use ordinances.
Accordingly, there was no false representation, concealment of fact, or change in position such
as would trigger the application of estoppel or quasi-estoppel in this case.

See Williams v.

Blakely, 114 Idaho 323, 325, 757 P.2d 186, 188 (1987); Allen, 145 Idaho at 812, 186 P.3d at 668.
The only potential basis for the application of either doctrine was addressed by the Board
when it decided to allow the barbeque pit to remain, notwithstanding the fact that it was partially
within the no-disturbance zone, since it was depicted as straddling the no-disturbance zone
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boundary in the site plan approved by the Department.

Otherwise, the violation of the no-

disturbance zone requirement was the direct result of actions taken by Stafford, and it is
Stafford's responsibility to remediate it to a more natural state. Therefore, this Court should
affirm the District Court's finding that the Board should not be estopped from enforcing the nodisturbance zone regulations contained in the Site Disturbance Ordinance in this case.

D.

No substantial rights of Stafford were prejudiced by the decision of the Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners in Case No. APP08-0002.
Even if a decision of a governing board made under LLUP A is found to have violated

one or more provisions of Idaho Code §67-5279, the decision must nevertheless be affirmed
unless substantial rights of the aggrieved party were prejudiced by the decision.

Noble v.

Kootenai County, 148 Idaho 937, 943, 231 P. 3d 1034, 1040 (2010) (decision denying
subdivision application affirmed notwithstanding finding that decision was made upon unlawful
procedure). Here, no substantial rights of Stafford have been prejudiced because Stafford does
not have the right to maintain the subject property in a condition constituting an ongoing
violation of a provision of the Site Disturbance O,rdinance which has not materially changed
since the violation first occurred. In addition, Stafford was afforded due process throughout the
administrative appeal and District Court appeal process, including the identification of an
appropriate remedy for the violation.

V. CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts show that since 2001, the Stafford property has been, and continues
to be, in clear violation of the Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance in effect at any given
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time. Thus, the Board's finding to that effect is supported by substantial evidence if the record
and is neither arbitrary nor capricious. In addition, this Court should decline Stafford's invitation
to twist the nonconforming use and ex post facto doctrines and the word "supersede" in a manner
which would effectively excuse ongoing conduct which was unlawful at the time it began and
has consistently remained unlawful to this day. Finally, the Court should not apply the doctrine
of estoppel in this case so as to proscribe the County from enforcing a prohibition of activities
occurring within the no-disturbance zone which it had never permitted.
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the decision of the District Court affirming the
decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners in Case No. APP08-0002 should be

AFFIRMED, and the County should be awarded its costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40.
Dated this

Zl.fh day of July, 2010.
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

Patrick M. Braden, Civil Deputy
Attorney for Respondents
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